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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
BARNES BANKING COMPANY, a
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of Financial Institutions of the State of
Utah; ELROY NELSON, THOMAS
F. HAWKES and LINN C. BAKER
and FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a bank holding company,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
13946

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
ELROY NELSON, THOMAS F. HAWKES and LINN
C. BAKER and FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION,
a bank holding company

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action asking the trial court
to review the administrative order of the Commissioner
of Financial Institutions granting the application of cer-
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tain defendants to organize a unit bank in Kaysville,
Utah and to enjoin the establishment of said bank.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court held that the findings, order and procedures of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions
were proper and sustained the agency's findings. The
trial court found that there were no material issues of
fact before the court, and it therefore granted a summary
judgment to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order of this court vacating the
trial court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 23, 1973, Elroy Nelson, Thomas F.
Hawkes and Linn C. Baker, as officers of First Security
Corporation, a bank holding company, or its affiliates,
filed with the Commissioner of Financial Institutions an
application for permission to organize a unit bank in the
city of Kaysville, Utah. The Commissioner, after the
appropriate notice to all concerned, called a public hearing on June 20, 1973, to consider the application. At the
hearing Barnes Banking Company fully presented its
opposition to the application.
On August 22, 1973, W. S. Brimhall, Commissioner
of Financial Institutions for the State of Utah, (hereinDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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after referred to as the Bank Commissioner (§ 7-1-1.2,
Utah Code Annotated 1953) entered his findings of
fact, conclusions and order conditionally granting the
application of defendants to organize the proposed First
Security State Bank of Kaysville in the City of Kaysville.1
The appellant has the only bank in the rapidly growing suburban Kaysville - Fruit Heights area. After the
respondents' application to establish a state unit bank
in that area was granted, appellant by this court action
attempted to block the implementation of the Commissioner's decision. By this means appellant seeks to maintain its monopoly in the banking services offered in the
relevant market area by attempting to prevent the entry of any competitive alternative.
First Security Corporation has no branch, unit bank
or affiliate in the Kaysville - Fruit Heights area. In an
area larger than the relevant market, Davis County,
First Security has only a small service office at Hill Field,
one branch in the northern part of the county, and a unit
bank in Bountiful.
1

"The application of Elroy Nelson, Thomas F. Hawkes and Linn
C. Baker for permission to organize a unit bank in Kaysville, Davis
County, Utah, to be known as First Security Bank of Kaysville,
is hereby granted subject to the conditions that it obtain approval
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for insurance of
its accounts and that First Security Corporation obtain approval
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for
acquisition of subsantially all of the shares of the new bank." See
Exhibit A accompanying defendants' brief in support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THERE WAS NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO
ANY MATERIAL FACT BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT.
The agency is the finder of fact. The only questions
before the trial court were questions of law.
Professor Moore, in his treatise on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, discussed the applicability of Federal
Rule 56 to the review of an administrative order:
Thus in an action to . . . obtain review of an administrative order where the plaintiff has no right
to a trial de novo, but is limited to a review of
the record before the agency and this record is
before the court, the case is ripe for summary
disposition, for whether the order is supported
by sufficient evidence, under the applicable statutory standard, or is otherwise legally assailable
involves matters of law. 6 J. Moore, Federal
Practice, 2d Ed. (1974), Para. 56.17[3] at 2472.
See Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F. 2d 456 (9th
Cir. 1964).
This discussion, although referring to the federal rule,
is analogous. It expresses the rationale behind both the
federal and state Rule 56 and the applicability of the rule
in a situation involving review of administrative decisions
on either the federal or state level. Utah Rule 56(c),
according to the compiler's notes, is similar to FedDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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eral Rule 56(c). It appears that the federal analogy is
appropriate.
This court has enunciated the principle of the court's
deferring to the factual determination of the administrative agency. In Central Bank N Trust Co. v. Brimhall,
28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P. 2d 638 (1972) the court stated at
page 18:
In the field of administrative law the assumption
is indulged that the administrator (or administrative tribunal) possesses superior knowledge
and expertise because of specialized training and
experience, and the focus of interest within the
particular field. For this reason the well-established rule is that the courts indulge him considerable latitude in determinations he makes on
questions of fact and also in the exercise of his
discretion with respect to the responsibilities
which the law imposes upon him; {Camacho v.
Industrial Comm. of Utah, 119 Utah 181, 225
P. 2d 728; City of North Las Vegas v. Public
Service Comm., 83 Nev. 278, 429 P. 2d 66) and
they will not interfere therewith unless it appears that he acted in excess of his powers, or
that he so abused his discretion that his action
was capricious or arbitrary. (Sec. 7-1-26(4),
U. C. A. 1953; Zions First National Bank, N.A.
v. Taylor, 15 Utah 2d 239, 390 P. 2d 854; Uintah
Freight Lines v. Public Service Comm., 119 Utah
491, 229 P. 2d 675).
The trial court properly granted a summary judgment after it found as a matter of law that the record of the proceeding before the administrative agency
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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contained substantial evidence and that the Bank Commissioner's ruling was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law".
§ 7-1-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
POINT II.

THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE A TRIAL
DE NOVO OF THE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY.
A. The issue of whether the proposed bank
would interfere with appellant's business was
properly decided by the State Agency.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 7-1-26(4), the
action of the Bank Commissioner in granting the defendants' application is reviewable in the district court. The
scope of that review is defined as follows:
The reviewing court shall have power to hold
unlawful and set aside any act, decision or ruling of the bank commissioner found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted this statute in a
similar fact situation in Central Bank & Trust Company
v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P. 2d 638 (1972) at page
18:
Our duty is to look upon the whole evidence in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the light favorable to the determination made by
the Bank Commissioner and the trial court, and
to sustain them if there is a reasonable basis in
the evidence to justify doing so.
. . . [The courts] will not interfere [with an administrator's decision] unless it appears that he
acted in excess of his powers, or that he so abused
his discretion that his action was capricious or
arbitrary.
Plaintiff-appellant in its brief does not contest the
legal findings of the trial court that: (1) there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the Commissioner's findings and order; (2) the Commissioner did not
abuse his discretion; and (3) the decision by the Commissioner was not a capricious or arbitrary action. Rather,
the plaintiff-appellant faults the lower court for not indulging in a trial de novo on the factual issues heard and
decided by the Commissioner.
Appellant contends that because there was some
evidence in the record that could be viewed as suporting
the plaintiff's contentions^ this court should replace the
state agency's factual determination with another view
of the fact. See page 8 of appellants' brief.
Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, does not
provide a trial de novo for a protestant to the Bank OomCommissioner's decision. The court should not weigh
the evidence. Rather it simply determines if there is
enough evidence in the record to support the Commissioner's view of the evidence. In other words, the court
determines if there is some factual basis in the record

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
for the Commissioner's findings. See Central Bank &
Trust Co. v. Brimhall, supra.
The plaintiff fully presented its assertions and any
evidence it had to the finder of fact. The administrative
agency with its expertise in the area chose to believe the
evidence in support of defendants-respondents' position.
The substantial evidence in support of the Commissioner's ruling that the proposed bank would not interfere with plaintiff's existing banking business is primarily found in the transcript of record of hearing before
the Commissioner at pages 155-204 and pages 282 to
289. Within those portions of the transcript reference
is made to an economic survey found at page 111 to and
including page 147 of the record herein.
The substantial evidence presented to the Commissioner clearly reveals that the proposed new bank would
not materially damage plaintiff's existing bank. The proposed new bank would acquire new accounts held by
residents of Kaysville - Fruit Heights in other banks
outside of the Kaysville area. The proposed new bank
would better serve the growing demand for banking business in the Kaysville area and present its residents with
a choice of banks, but it would not damage plaintiff's
existing banking business. Historically, new unit banks
have not damaged the existing banking business in areas
similarly situated to the Kaysville area. The establishment of new unit banks did not damage new banks in
the areas of Layton, Bountiful and Springville (Tr. p.
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201). See also Central Bank & Trust Co. v Brimhali9
28 Utah 2d 14 (1972).
Additionally, the testimony before the Bank Commissioner contains substantial evidence that the Banking
Commissioner appropriately exercised the broad discretion conferred upon him by statute when he approved
defendants' application. The record clearly reveals that
the proposed new bank would not materially damage
plaintiff's existing business. The record compels the conclusion that there is a tremendous need in the Kaysville
area for the proposed new bank and that showing of need
makes it hard to envision that the existing bank would
be damaged.
The banking needs within the Kaysville area are not
being satisfied by plaintiff's existing bank (Tr. pp. 166,
173, 176 and 184). Deposits by Kaysville residents in
banks outside the Kaysville area and loans to Kaysville
residents by banks outside the Kaysville area indicate
that Kaysville residents prefer to transact banking business with banks other than plaintiff's bank (Tr. p. 190).
Some of the numerous deposits and loans by Kaysville
residents with banks other than plaintiff's existing bank
will probably be transferred by Kaysville residents to the
proposed new unit bank for the convenience of the Kaysville residents. This transfer of loans and accounts would
take nothing from plaintiff's existing bank because it
does not have the business and would not acquire that
business (Tr. p. 190).
Furthermore, the new bank would satisfy the credit
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
needs of the Kaysville area (Tr. p. 195). Plaintiff's existing bank cannot and will not furnish the demand for
mortgage funds for the substantial new housing development in the Kaysville area (Tr. p. 196). The new bank
will help satisfy a growing demand for additional banking services required by the growth in the number of
residents in the Kaysville area (Tr. p. 173). The growth
in population in the Kaysville area has created a greater
demand for credit (Tr. p. 176) and the new bank will
probably have a policy for loans that will assist in satisfying this demand which plaintiff's existing bank's policy
prevents it from satisfying (Tr. p. 195). Plaintiff's existing bank has a ratio of loans to deposits that is far
below any other bank in the area. The existing bank's
loan policies prevent that bank from satisfying the banking needs of the growing Kaysville - Fruit Heights area.
All of this evidence before the Bank Commissioner overwhelmingly demonstrates a growing demand for banking
service in the Kaysville area and the failure of the existing, plaintiff-appellant's bank to meet that demand.
There is substantial evidence in the record to support
the Bank Commissioner's conclusion that the defendanits'
proposed new bank will not interfere with the plainitiffappellant's bank.
B. The Commissioner properly decided the issues under the state statutes within his primary jurisdiction and he properly conditioned his order upon the findings under the
federal banking and antitrust statutes by
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the federal banking agencies who have primary jurisdiction over the federal banking
issues.
Plaintiff -appellant appears to argue in its brief that
the plaintiff's business will be hurt by the Commissioner's action allowing a competitive alternative to Barnes
to come into the Kaysville - Fruit Heights area because
such action would allegedly violate the antitrust laws.
However, it would appear that the entry of a competitor
into a market where there is presently only one bank,
would foster the purpose behind the antitrust laws — to
encourage competition.
Appellant's argument is even more confusing. It
argues in its brief to this court, although it failed to
argue this point to the trial court, that it is not asking
the trial court to interpret the antitrust statutes for a determination of liability under them, but for a determination of whether their standards were violated. Plaintiff
may be attempting to draw this amtificiai distinction as a
means of evading the statement made by plaintiff's counsel at oral argument on defendants' motion for summary
judgment when be said that the state trial court had no
jurisdiction to decide if the antitrust laws had been violated.
The Bank Commissioner conditioned his order upon
the approval of the federal banking agencies which were
examining the federal antitrust issues. The federal agencies with their experience and expertise have the primary
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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jurisdiction to decide if any federal antitrust violation
would occur by respondents' acquisition of a unit bank
in the Kaysville - Fruit Heights area. Exclusive jurisdiction or primary jurisdiction to examine in the first instance alleged violations of the antitrust laws or federal
banking laws is given to the federal agencies with expertise in the banking area. See Whitney National Bank
v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411 (1965)2 and the
defendants' brief in support of its Motion for Summary
Judgment, pp. 6-8.
The agencies with the expertise in determining
whether the standard of the federal antitrust laws have
been violated are precisely the federal agencies to whom
the plaintiff itself submitted the antitrust issues. See
Exhibit C accompanying defendants' brief in support of
its Motion for a Summary Judgment — plaintiff's letter
to the Federal Reserve Board, and Exhibit D — defendants' response to plaintiff's letter to the Federal Reserve Board.
2

In cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative
discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject
matter should not be passed over. This is so even though the facts
after they have been appraised by specialized competence serve
as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to
a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review
by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying
legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by
specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more
flexible procedure. (Emphasis added.) Whitney National Bank
v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U. S. 411, 421 (1965).
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Appellant attempted in its brief to argue the merits
of its dubious antitrust allegations. The defendants' letter to the Federal Reserve Board illustrates the inappropriateness of the cases cited on pages 18 and 19 of
appellant's brief. (See Exhibit D accompanying defendants' brief in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment.)
In addition, the plaintiff in its amended complaint,
paragraph 10 (a), made only a naked allegation that the
Commissioner's action would violate the antitrust laws.
The plaintiff in no way buttressed those allegations with
any specific reference to the facts in this case. These
allegations are a shallow attempt by the plaintiff-appellant to delay the implementation of the state administrative agency's decision in this matter.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on July 9, 1975, issued their opinion on the application of First Security Corporation to acquire First Security Bank of Kaysville, Kaysville, Utah.. The Board's
Order is attached as Exhibit A. This federal agency reviewed the comments submitted by Barnes Banking Company of Kaysville. After reviewing all the comments and
implications under the banking and antitrust laws, the
Federal Reserve Board concluded:
The establishment of Bank by Applicant First
Security should foster competition by introducing a banking alternative to Protestant [Barnes],
the only bank in Kaysville. Moreover, as a subsidiary of Applicant, Bank will be able to offer

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a broad range of banking services to the residents of the area. In the Board's judgment, the
benefits likely to be derived from Applicant's
proposal in terms of increased competition and
greater convenience and banking services are
such that approval of the application would be
appropriate. Accordingly, it is the Board's judgment that the proposed transaction would be in
the public interest and that the application should
be approved. Federal Reserve System Board of
Governor's Order approving Acquisition of Bank,
July 9, 1975, at page 4.
In this case, the state agency has the primary jurisdiction to examine the state issues and the federal banking agencies have the primary jurisdiction to examine the
federal antitrust and banking issues and to apply the
standards enunciated in the federal statutes. See Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, supra.
The appropriate federal agencies, the F.D.I.C. (the
F.D.I.C. Order is attached as Exhibit B) and the Federal
Reserve Board, after their own independent investigation
and analysis and after careful examination of the Protestant Barnes' [Appellant's] contentions have concluded
that the acquisition of a unit bank by the defendants in
Kaysville will not violate any federal banking or antitrust
laws,
CONCLUSION
Appellant has ignored the central issue before this
court: Is there substantial evidence in the record to
support the state agency's decision? Plaintiff-appellant
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attempts to put this court in 'the posture of redeciding
factual issues that were properly decided by the Commissioner of Financial Institutions. There is subsitanitial
evidence in the record to support the administrative decision.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
L. Ridd Larson and
Jonathan A. Dibble
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
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EXHIBIT A
FEDEI IAL RESERVE S Y STEM;
FIRST SEC! JRITY CORPORATION
Order Approving Acquisition of Bank
First Security Corporation, Salt Lake City; Utah,
a bank holding company within the meaning of the Bank
;
ling Company Act, has applied for the Board's approval under § 3(a) (3) of the Act (12U.S.C. 1842(a) (3))
to acquire all oi the voting shares of First Security ^tnt<
Bank of Kaysville, Kaysville, Utah.
Notice of the application, affording opportunity for
Interested persons to submit comments and views, has
been given in accordance with § 3(b) of the Act. The
time for filing comments and views has expired, and the
Board has considered the application and -all comments
received, including those submitted on behalf of Barnes
Banking Company of Kaysville ("Protestant''?, in light
of the factors set forth in & V<^ of the Act .' r ^ C
1 842 (c\),
>licant, the largest banking organization in Utah,
controls six Utah banks with aggregate deposits of $844.1
million, representing approximately 28.5 per cent of all
commercial bank deposits in the state.1 In addition, Applicant controls one bank in Idaho and one bank in Wy1

Banking data are as of December .il. I'.)<'] unless otherwise nidi
cated, and reflect holding compam iummtions and -irqui^itions
approved through May 31, 1975.
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oming, each of which was acquired by Applicant prior
to the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956. Since Bank is a proposed new bank, its acquisition
by Applicant would not immediately increase Applicant's
share of commercial bank deposits in Utah.
Bank is to be located in Kaysville, a smaU "bedroom"
community situated almost midway between Ogden and
Salt Lake City. Kaysville, which is presently served by
only one other bank, the "Protestant/' is located on the
southern boundary of the Ogden metropolitan area,2 a
market served by ten banks. Applicant's lead bank is the
largest bank in this market, with a 30.9 per cent share
of total deposits (as of June 30, 1973). Since Bank is a
new bank, consummation of the proposal would not eliminate any existing competition. Nor does it appear that
the transaction would have adverse effects on the development of competition in the future. Accordingly, competitive considerations are regarded by the Board as being consistent with approval of the application.
The financial and managerial resources and future
prospects of Applicant and its subsidiaries are regarded
as satisfactory. Bank, as a proposed new bank, has no
financial or operating history; however, its future prospects as a subsidiary of Applicant appear favorable. Bank
would provide a source of additional full banking services
to the residents of the Kaysville area. Accordingly, considerations relating to the convenience and needs of the
2

Defined as the Rand-McNally R.M.A. of Ogden, Utah.
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community to be served lend some weight toward approval of the application.
In its consideration of the subject application, the
Board has considered the comments submitted on behalf
of Protestant, a bank located one block from the proposed site of Bank. Protestant, a unit bank with deposits
of approximately $17 million, contends that Applicant's
acquisition of Bank would lessen competition, restrain
trade, and tend toward monopoly, without producing any
countervailing advantage to the convenience and needs
of the citizens of Kaysville. These contentions were presented before the CoinmissioiK-i at Financial Institutions
of the State of Utah at :-\ public hearing during the pendency of the charter application of Bank,3 In an Order
dated August 22, 1973, the Commissioner approved the
establishment of Bank, pending approval by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation of insurance for Bank's
accounts and approval by the Board of the application
herein. Protestant appealed the Commissioner's Order
to the District Court in and for the Salt Lake County,
Utah, which granted a Motion for Sumrnaiy indprr^nt
in favor of Applicant and Bank on December LI, ly?4.
Subsequently, Protestant appealed the District Court
action to the Supreme Court of Utah, which has not yet
rendered its decision on the appeal,
3

Protestant have submitted to the Board copies of the Commissioner's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and Order, and the Board
has made those materials part; of thr nro'-l --»n which it relied in
this matter.
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In the Board's opinion, the objection of Protestant
does not warrant denial of the subject application. The
home-office protection laws of Utah prevent any of Applicant's existing banks from establishing branches in
KaysviUe. Accordingly, aside from the acquisition of
Protestant, the subject proposal represents Applicant's
sole means of competing directly in the KaysviUe community. The establishment of Bank by AppMcant should
foster competition by introducing a banking alternative
to Protestant, the only bank in KaysviUe. Moreover, as
a subsidiary of Applicant, Bank wUl be able to offer a
broad range of banking services to the residents of the
area. In the Board's judgment, the benefits likely to be
derived from Applicant's proposal in teams of increased
competition and greater convenience and banking services are such that approval of the application would be
appropriate. Accordingly, it is the Board's judgment that
the proposed transaction would be in the public interest
and that the application should be approved.
On the basis of the record, the application is approved for the reasons summarized above. The transaction shall not be made (a) before the thirtieth calendar
day following the effective date of this Order, nor (b)
later than three months after that date, and (c) First
Security State Bank of KaysviUe, KaysviUe, Utah shall
be opened for business not later than six months after
the effective date of this Order. Each of the periods described in (b) and (c) may be extended for good cause
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by the Board, or by the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco pursuant to delegated authority.
By order of the Board -of Governors, 4 effective July
9, 1975.
(Signed) Ilieodore E. Ai lison

Theodore E. Allison
Secretary of the Boa rd
[SEAL]
EXHIBIT B
FEDERAL

DEPOSH

;

\-' " •* /

< ; ' '"\* * .'/.V

I N R E : First Security State Bank of Kaysville
(Proposed)
Kaysville, Davis County, Utah
Application for Federal Drpnsit hi-iij. = -.r,
ORDER
The Board of Directors has fully considered all facts and
information relevant to the Factors of Section 6 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act and relating to the application for Federal deposit insurance for the proposed First
Security State Bank n; K.ivsville, Kav.*:vilk\ I Jfcah, in4
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Ali^-Ht t*m\ not voting;

Chairman Burns.
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vi
eluding facts and information made available to the Board
of Directors by the proponents, the Corporation's Division of Bank Supervision and other information acquired
by the Corporation.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the application submitted on behalf of the proposed First Security State Bank of Kaysville, to be located at 250 North
Main Street, Kaysville, Davis County, Utah, be and the
same hereby is approved subject to the following conditions:
1.

That beginning paid-in capital funds of at
least $500,000 be provided of Which no less
than $200,000 shall be allocated to common
capital and no less than $200,000 to surplus;

2.

That Fitfst Security Corporation (a registered bank holding company) obtain prior
approval from the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System to acquire voting control of the stock of the proposed
bank;

3.

That any changes in proposed management
or proposed ownership (5% or more of
stock) will render this commitment null and
void unless such proposal is approved by the
Director, Division of Bajnk Supervision, prior
to opening of the bank;

4.

That Federal deposit insurance will not become effective unless and until the applicant has been established as a State bank
(not a member of the Federal Reserve System), that it has authority to conduct a
banking business and that its establishment
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\ III.

and operation as a bank has been fully approved by the State Banking Department;
5,

That until the conditional commitment herein ORDERED becomes effective, the Corporation shall have the right to alter, suspend, or withdraw the said commitment
should any interim development be deemed
by the Board of Directors to warrant such
action; and
™ i if deposit insurance has not become
effective by August 22, 1975 (expiration
date of State authorization), or unless, in
the meantime, a request for an extension of
time has been approved by the Corporation,
consent granted will expire on August 22,
1975.

Dnivd ru Washington!, II, C this 6th day of March,
l!)7f>.
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DIRECTORS

ALAN R. Mll.LKlx
Executive Secreuuy
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